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Abstract
This paper explores how the joint behavior of hiring and invest-
ment is governed by the expected present values of capital and of jobs.
It uses a model of frictions, which is a combination of a search model
of the labor market and a q-type model of the capital market, em-
phasizing the interaction of capital and labor frictions. Relying on
structural estimation of private sector U.S. data, it studies the future
determinants of capital and job values and the implications for U.S.
labor market developments.
Key ndings include: (i) complementarity between the hiring and
investment processes; (ii) important cross e¤ects, of the value of capital
on the mean and the volatility of the hiring rate, and vice versa; (iii)
future returns are shown to play a dominant role in determining capital
and job values; and (iv) U.S. labor market developments, including
the outward shift of the Beveridge curve in the Great Recession and
its aftermath 2007-2013, can be accounted for by changes in job and
capital values.
Key words: investment, hiring, present values, frictions, returns,
Great Recession.
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Capital Values and Job Values1
1 Introduction
This paper explores how the joint behavior of hiring and investment is gov-
erned by the expected present value of capital and labor. It uses a model of
frictions, a combination of a search model of the labor market and a q-type
model of the capital market, emphasizing the interaction of capital and labor
frictions. Hiring and investment are modelled as the outcomes of a dynamic,
intertemporal optimization problem of the representative rm. The paper
uses structural estimation of private sector U.S. data to answer the following
four specic questions: (i) how do capital and labor expected present values
determine hiring and investment? (ii) how big are these values, i.e., how big
are the relevant frictions? (iii) what determinants drive expected present
values? (iv) how can recent U.S. labor market developments including the
Great Recession period be understood in terms of capital and job (labor)
values?
The answers to these questions are important for a number of key issues.
The evolution of employment and of the capital stock are essential for the
understanding of macroeconomic uctuations. It has been shown that gross
hiring is a major factor for understanding employment and unemployment
dynamics.2 Hiring frictions were shown to play a key role in determining
the business cycle properties of labor productivity (including its declining
1This paper is dedicated to the memory of Dale Mortensen, a great inspiration, an
academic leader and a much-beloved colleague. I thank Jordi Gali, Robert Hall, Gianluca
Violante and, in particular, Giuseppe Moscarini for valuable comments and suggestions. I
am gratfeul to conference participants at the NBER- RSW group, ESSIM- CEPR, Aarhus
University-Sandbjerg, Sapir Forum Jerusalem conference and SaM-Edinburgh and to sem-
inar audiences at Yale, LSE, Tel Aviv University, CREI, EUI, Bristol, Queen Mary, the
Bank of England, Birbeck College and Keio for helpful comments on previous versions. I
am indebted to Avihai Lifschitz and Ziv Usha for excellent research assistance. Any errors
are my own.
2See, for example, Hall (2007) and Rogerson and Shimer (2011).
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pro-cyclicality) and of the job nding rate (including its high volatility).3
Investment is key for the understanding of the evolution of the capital stock
and consequently of rm market value.4
The results of this inquiry can explain the outward shift of the Beveridge
curve and the big rise in unemployment in the Great Recession using changes
in capital and job values. These ndings have implications for business cycle
modelling, such as the importance of incorporating joint investment and
hiring costs, complete with the cited interaction, into DSGE models. The
analysis takes into account the distinct, specic roles played by vacancy
creation, gross hiring from non-employment, and job to job movements (as
well as the separation ows involved).
A major implication of the ndings is that hiring and investment can
be treated as forward-looking variables, reecting the expectations of future
discounted prots from employing labor and capital. Using the results of
estimation, I employ a restricted VAR analysis, such as the one used in the
asset pricing literature, to study this forward-looking aspect. The analy-
sis shows how investment and hiring are related to their expected, future
determinants, with future returns turning out to play the dominant role.
This approach naturally links up with stock prices that are also forward-
looking and relate to the same expected discounted future prots. Indeed,
in previous work, joint with Monika Merz (Merz and Yashiv (2007)), we
have shown that this set-up allows one to dene asset values for hiring
and for investment and that these values can be used to explain the time
variation of equity values of rms in the U.S. economy. The current paper
retains the focus on forward-looking behavior but does not make use of stock
market data or tries to explain them. It updates the previous estimates,
using a longer sample period, one that includes the Great Recession and its
3Gali and van Rens (2014) show that a lower degree of hiring frictions may lower the
cyclicality of labor productivity in ways which are consistent with actual U.S. aggregate
data dynamics. Coles and Mortensen (2013a,b) study the role of hiring costs in dynamic
environments which generate a result whereby there is no Shimer puzzle and the job
nding rate volatility matches the data.
4See, for example, Cochrane (2011).
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aftermath, and then proceeds to examine a totally di¤erent set of empirical
implications.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briey discusses the rele-
vant strands of literature. Section 3 presents the rms optimization problem
and the resulting optimality conditions to be estimated. Section 4 discusses
estimation issues and presents the results. It uses the results to look at
the implied magnitude of frictions and to gauge the plausibility of the esti-
mates. Section 5 discusses hiring and investment as driven by their present
values and compares the derived job values to those implied by the standard
matching model. Section 6 undertakes the VAR analysis and decomposes
the present value relationships embodied in the model. Section 7 looks at
the ability of the results to provide a stylized account of U.S. labor mar-
ket developments, including the shift of the Beveridge curve and the high
unemployment rate of the Great Recession. Section 8 concludes. Technical
matters and data issues are treated in appendices.
2 Background Literature
The literature on hiring and on investment is very large. In what follows I
allude to those papers that relate directly to the focus of this paper.
First is the literature on search and matching models, which feature
dynamic, optimal vacancy decisions by rms in the face of frictions; see Pis-
sarides (2000), Yashiv (2007), and Rogerson and Shimer (2011) for overviews
and surveys. Recruiting costs and time lags are the expression of frictions
in these models. The rst order condition for optimal vacancy creation is
a key ingredient and this is one of the two estimating equations examined
here. The nding in this literature, as indicated above, is that gross hiring,
subject to these frictions, is key in accounting for employment and unem-
ployment dynamics. The model here features a generalization of the hiring
problem and a wider concept of costs relative to what has been considered
by these models.
The second strand of relevant literature includes investment models,
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mostly following the seminal contributions of Lucas and Prescott (1971)
and of Tobin (1969) and Hayashi (1982). These models have been studied
extensively for over four decades. The idea in these models is that costs
are key to the understanding of investment behavior. These models have
encountered a lot of empirical di¢ culties and have engendered much debate
(see, for example, the discussion in Chirinko (1993) and Smith (2008)). Like
search and matching models, much of this literature does not feature the
other factor of production, namely labor. In the current paper I present re-
sults both from the traditionalformulation of the investment costs model
and from a formulation which allows for the interaction of investment costs
and hiring costs.
It should also be noted that models of the business cycle (evidently) fea-
ture optimal hiring and investment decisions. Many of them do not feature
frictions, though a large part of the RBC literature assumes lags in the in-
stallation of capital. The latest vintage of business cycle models, surveyed
by Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2010), posits costs for investment
but no frictions in hiring. Note, too, that in business cycle models there is
no explicit interaction between hiring costs and investment costs.
A key issue in the current paper is the mutual dependence of hiring
and investment and the interaction of their costs. This is not a new issue.
Mortensen (1973) has examined the interrelation of costs in a theoretical
model and over the years some empirical work was attempted; prominent
examples include Nadiri and Rosen (1969), Shapiro (1986), and Hall (2004).
These studies point to the potential importance of including costs on both
capital and labor. However key di¤erences with the current study are that
these papers do not model at least one of three elements, which the empir-
ical work below nds to be of crucial importance: (i) an interaction term
between the two costs; (ii) gross, as opposed to net, hiring ows; and (iii)
aggregate, as opposed to micro-level, hiring and investment. It should also
be emphasized, that the current paper stays within the representative rm
framework of the cited literature and does not at all attempt to go into a
rm-level or sector-level analysis. Hence most of the ndings of the latter
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type of studies may be di¤erent from what is reported here.
This paper stresses the forward-looking aspect of hiring and investment.
Consequently an important issue is the future determinants of current behav-
ior. This issue is studied, for the case of stock prices, by a sizeable strand of
literature in Finance, launched by the work of Campbell and Shiller (1988).
A key concern in this literature has been the question of what is the relative
importance of dividend growth and of future returns for stock price volatil-
ity. I make use of the methodology developed in this literature, examined by
Cochrane (2011), to determine the relative importance of the future deter-
minants of current hiring and current investment. Recently, Hall (2014) has
taken up this issue, albeit making use of a di¤erent empirical methodology.
3 The Model
I delineate a partial equilibrium model which serves as the basis for estima-
tion. There are identical workers and identical rms, who live forever and
have rational expectations. All variables are expressed in terms of output.
Firms. Firms make gross investment (it) and vacancy (vt) decisions.
Once a new worker is hired, the rm pays him or her a per-period wage wt.
Firms use physical capital (kt) and labor (nt) as inputs in order to produce
output goods yt according to a constant-returns-to-scale production function
f with productivity shock zt:
yt = f(zt;nt; kt); (1)
Gross hiring and gross investment are subject to frictions, spelled out
below, and hence are costly activities. I represent these costs by a function
g[it; kt; vt; ht; nt] which is convex in the rms decision variables and exhibits
constant returns-to-scale, allowing hiring costs and investment costs to in-
teract.
In every period t, the capital stock depreciates at the rate t and is
augmented by new investment it. Similarly, workers separate at the rate  t
and the employment stock is augmented by new hires qtvt = ht: The laws
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of motion are:
kt+1 = (1  t)kt + it; 0  t  1: (2)
nt+1 = (1   t)nt + qtvt; 0   t  1 (3)
qtvt = ht
The representative rm chooses sequences of it and vt in order to maxi-
mize its prots as follows:
max
fit+j ;vt+jg
Et
1X
j=0
 
jY
i=0
t+i
!
(1  t+j)
0@ f(zt+j;nt+j ; kt+j)  g (it+j ; kt+j ; vt+j ; ht+j ; nt+j)
 wt+jnt+j  
 
1  t+j    t+jDt+j
 epIt+j it+j
1A
(4)
subject to the constraints (2) and (3), and where  t is the corporate income
tax rate, wt is the wage, t the investment tax credit, Dt the present dis-
counted value of capital depreciation allowances, ~pIt the real pre-tax price of
investment goods, and t+j is a time-varying discount factor: The rm takes
the paths of the variables qt; wt; pIt ; t;  t;  t and t as given. This is con-
sistent with the standard models in the search and matching and Tobins q
literatures. The Lagrange multipliers associated with these two constraints
are QKt+j and Q
N
t+j , respectively. These Lagrange multipliers can be inter-
preted as marginal q for physical capital, and marginal q for employment,
respectively. I shall use the term capital value or present value of investment
for the former and job value or present value of hiring for the latter.
The rst-order conditions for dynamic optimality are:5
QKt = Et

t+1

(1   t+1)
 
fkt+1   gkt+1

+ (1  t+1)QKt+1

(5)
QKt = (1   t)
 
git + p
I
t

(6)
QNt = Et

t+1

(1   t+1)
 
fnt+1   gnt+1   wt+1

+
 
1   t+1

QNt+1

(7)
QNt = (1   t)
gvt
qt
(8)
5where I use the real after-tax price of investment goods, given by:
pIt+j =
1  t+j    t+jDt+j
1   t+j epIt+j :
7
I can summarize the rms rst-order necessary conditions from equations
(5)-(8) by the following two expressions:
(1   t)
 
git + p
I
t

= Et
24t;t+1 (1   t+1)
24 fkt+1   gkt+1
+(1  t+1)(git+1 + pIt+1)
3535
(9)
(1   t) gvt
qt
= Et
24t;t+1 (1   t+1)
24 fnt+1   gnt+1   wt+1
+(1   t+1)
gvt+1
qt+1
3535 (10)
Worker Flows. Consider worker ows. The 10ow from non-employment
unemployment (U) and out of the labor force (O) to employment is to
be denoted OE + UE and the separation rate  t is rate of the ow in the
opposite direction, EU + EO. Worker ows within employment i.e., job
to job ows are to be denoted EE:
I shall denote:
h
n
=

h1
n

+

h2
n

h1
n
=
OE + UE
E
h2
n
=
EE
E
Hence h1 and h2 denote ows from non-employment and from other
employment, respectively.
Separation rates are given by:
 =  1 +  2
 1 =
EO + EU
E
 2 =
EE
E
=
h2
n
Equation (3) now satises:
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nt+1 = (1   1t    2t )nt + h1t + h2t (11)
= (1   t)nt + ht; 0   t  1
h2t =  
2
t
Matching and Separations.6 Firms hire from non-employment (h1t ) and
from other rms (h2t ). Each period, the workers e¤ective units of labor
(normally 1 per person) depreciate to 0, in the current rm, with some ex-
ogenous probability  t. Thus, the match su¤ers an irreversible idiosyncratic
shock that makes it no longer viable. The worker may be reallocated to a
new rm where his/her productivity is (temporarily) restored to 1. This
happens with a probability of  2t : Those who are not reallocated join un-
employment, with probability  1t =  t    2t : So the fraction  2t that enters
job to job ows depends on the endogenous hiring ow h2t . The rm decides
how many vacancies to open and, given job lling rates (q1t ; q
2
t ), will get to
hire from the pre-existing non-employed and from the pool of matches just
gone sour. The matching rates satisfy:
q1t =
h1t
vt
(12)
q2t =
h2t
vt
qt = q
1
t + q
2
t
4 Estimation
I estimate equations (9) and (10), using structural estimation and alternative
versions of the model. In what follows I present the parameterization of the
production and costs functions, the econometric methodology, the data and
the estimation results.
6 I am indebted to Giuseppe Moscarini for very useful suggestions to this section.
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4.1 Methodology
To estimate the model I need to parameterize the relevant functions. For
the production function I use a standard Cobb-Douglas formulation, with
productivity shock zt:
f(zt;nt; kt) = e
ztnt
k1 t ; 0 <  < 1: (13)
The costs function g; capturing the di¤erent frictions in the hiring and
investment processes, is at the focus of the estimation work and merits dis-
cussion. Specically, hiring costs include costs of advertising, screening and
testing, matching frictions, training costs and more. Investment involves im-
plementation costs, nancial premia on certain projects, capital installation
costs, learning the use of new equipment, etc. Both activities may involve,
in addition to production disruption, the implementation of new organiza-
tional structures within the rm and new production techniques.7 In sum
g is meant to capture all the frictions involved in getting workers to work
and capital to operate in production, and not, say, just capital adjustment
costs or vacancy costs. One should keep in mind that this is formulated as
the costs function of the representative rm within a macroeconomic model,
and not one of a single rm in a heterogenous rms micro set-up.
Functional Form. The parametric form I use is the following, generalized
convex function.
g() =
26664
e1
1
( itkt )
1
+ e22
h
(1 1 2)vt+1q1t vt+2q2t vt
nt
i2
+ e3131

it
kt
q1t vt
nt
31
+ e3232

it
kt
q2t vt
nt
32
37775 f(zt; nt; kt): (14)
This function is linearly homogenous in its arguments i; k; v; h; n. The
parameters el, l = 1; 2; 31; 32 express scale, and the parameters 1; 2; 31; 32
express the convexity of the costs function with respect to its di¤erent ar-
guments. 1 is the weight in the cost function assigned to hiring from
non-employment (h
1
t
nt
), 2 is the weight assigned to hiring from other rms
7See Alexopoulos (2011) and Alexopoulos and Tombe (2012).
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(h
2
t
nt
), and (1   1   2) is the weight assigned to vacancy ( vtnt ) costs. The
weights 1 and 2 are thus related to the training and production disruption
aspects, while the complementary weight is related to the vacancy creation
and recruiting aspects. The last two terms in square brackets capture inter-
actions between investment and hiring. I rationalize the use of this form in
what follows.
Arguments of the function. This specication captures the idea that fric-
tions or costs increase with the extent of the activity in question vacancy
creation, hiring and investment. This needs to be modelled relative to the
size of the rm. The intuition is that hiring 10 workers, for example, means
di¤erent levels of hiring activity for rms with 100 workers or for rms with
10,000 workers. Hence rm size, as measured by its physical capital stock
or its level of employment, is taken into account and the costs function is
increasing in the vacancy, hiring and investment rates, vn ;
h
n and
i
k : The func-
tion used postulates that costs are proportional to output, i.e., the results
can be stated in terms of lost output.
More specically, the terms in the function presented above may be
justied as follows (drawing on Garibaldi and Moen (2009)): suppose each
worker i makes a recruiting and training e¤ort hi; as this is to be modelled
as a convex function, it is optimal to spread out the e¤orts equally across
workers so hi = hn ; formulating the costs as a function of these e¤orts and
putting them in terms of output per worker one gets c
 
h
n
 f
n ; as n workers
do it then the aggregate cost function is given by c
 
h
n

f:
Convexity. I use a convex function, allowing for alternative specications
of the degree of convexity (quadratic, cubic) and looking also at a linear
specication. The use of such a function may be questioned at the micro-
level, as non-convexities were found to be signicant at that level (plant,
establishment, or rm). But a number of recent papers have given empirical
support to the use of a convex function in the aggregate, showing that such
a formulation is appropriate at the macroeconomic level.8
8Thus, Thomas (2002) and Kahn and Thomas (2008, see in particular their discussion
on pages 417-421) study a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium model with nonconvex
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Interaction.. The terms e3131

it
kt
q1t vt
nt
31
and e3232

it
kt
q2t vt
nt
32
express the
interaction of investment and hiring costs. They allow for a di¤erent in-
teraction for hires from non-employment (h1t ) and from other rms (h
2
t ).
These terms, absent in many studies, have important implications for the
complementarity of investment and hiring.
Relation to Known Cases. The function above encompasses widely-used
cases as special cases:
a. The standard Tobins q model of investment which has e2 = e31 =
e32 = 0 and 1 = 2:
b. An analog Tobins q model for hiring which has e1 = e31 = e32 = 0
and 2 = 2:
c. The standard (Pissarides-type) matching model which has e1 = e31 =
e32 = 0; 1 = 2 = 0 and 2 = 1:
d. The case that abstracts from job to job ows and considers only ows
into (and out of) employment would have 2 = e32 = 0 and sets h2t =  
2
t = 0.
This case enables the use of a much larger data sample, 1976-2013, with 152
quarterly observations.
In estimation, I explore these alternative specications.
Estimation of the parameters in these functions allows for the quanti-
cation of the derivatives git and gvt that appear in the rms optimality
equations (9) and (10). I structurally estimate the rmsrst-order condi-
tions (9) and (10), using Hansens (1982) generalized method of moments
(GMM). The moment conditions estimated are those obtained under ratio-
nal expectations. I formulate the equations in stationary terms by dividing
(9) by ftkt and (10) by
ft
nt
: Appendix A spells out the rst derivatives included
in these equations. Importantly, I check whether the estimated g function
capital adjustment costs. One key idea which emerges from their analysis is that there are
smoothing e¤ects that result from equilibrium price changes. Favilukis and Lin (2011) use
data on asset prices as additional restrictions when examining rm investment behavior
and nd that ...within such a model, non-convex frictions are unnecessary to match
important features of aggregate investment...a model with convex costs alone does nearly
as good of a job at matching rm level micro data as our preferred model with both convex
and non-convex costs(page 26).
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fullls the convexity requirement.
4.2 The Data
The data are quarterly, pertain to the private sector of the U.S. economy.
For a large part of the empirical work reported below the sample period
is 1994-2013. The start date of 1994 is due to the lack of availability of
job to job worker ows (h2t ) data prior to that. For another part of the
empirical work, the sample covers 1976-2013 and the 1976 start is due to the
availability of credible monthly CPS data from which the gross hiring ows
(h1t ) series is derived. This longer sample period covers ve NBER-dated
recessions, including the Great Recession of 2007-2009 and its aftermath
(2009-2013). The data include NIPA data on GDP and its deator, capital,
investment, the price of investment goods and depreciation, BLS CPS data
on employment and on worker ows, and Fed data computations on tax and
depreciation allowances. Appendix B elaborates on the sources and on data
construction. These data have the following distinctive features: (i) they
pertain to the U.S. private sector; (ii) both hiring h and investment i refer
to gross ows; likewise, separation of workers  and depreciation of capital
 are gross ows; (iii) the estimating equations take into account taxes and
depreciation allowances. Table 1 presents key sample statistics.
Table 1
4.3 Estimation Results
Table 2 reports in two panels the results of estimation. The table reports
the estimates and their standard errors, Hansens (1982) J-statistic and its
p-value.
Table 2 a,b.
Panel (a) looks at the specications of the model discussed above. With
regard to the convexity of the costs function (14), row 1 examines a quadratic
function (1 = 2 = 2) with linear interactions (31 = 32 = 1) and row 2
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reports the cubic function (1 = 2 = 3) with linear interactions. The
weights on the di¤erent elements of the hiring process vacancies, hiring
from non-employment, and hiring from other employment are expressed
by the xed parameters 1 = 0:6; 2 = 0:2; obtained after some experi-
mentation. The parameters estimated are the scale parameters of the fric-
tions function (e1,e2; e31 and e32) and the labor share () of the production
function (13). The results for both these rows have J-statistics with high
p-values, are for the most part precisely estimated, and the resulting g func-
tion fullls all convexity requirements. In what follows I prefer to focus on
row 1, the quadratic case, for a number of reasons: all its parameters are
precisely estimated while e31 is not precisely estimated in row 2 (the cubic
case); the estimate of  is around the conventional estimate of 0.66, while
that of row 2 is lower; and the quadratic is more tractable for the computa-
tions which follow. Row 3 shows the results of estimation when ignoring job
to job ows and assigning all costs to hiring from non-employment (h
1
t
nt
); i.e.,
setting 1 = 1; 2 = e32 = 0 and h2t =  
2
t = 0. This allows for the use of a
much longer data sample 1976:1-2013:4, with 152 quarterly observations.
It too yields a J-statistic with a high p-value, is precisely estimated, and the
resulting g function fullls all convexity requirements.
Panel (b) of Table 2 looks at standard specications in the literature.
Row 1 sets 1 = 2; e2 = e31 = e32 = 0; i.e., quadratic investment costs,
with no role for hiring, as is typical of the Tobins q investment litera-
ture. The results do not reject the model. But some more experimenta-
tion, for example using di¤erent instrument sets, yields big variations in
the estimates, including very high positive e1 estimates. The production
parameter  is estimated to be relatively low at 0:63. Below it will be
shown that the implied costs are very high. Row 2 takes the analog for-
mulation for labor, i.e., 2 = 2; e1 = e31 = e32 = 0; i.e., quadratic va-
cancy and hiring costs, with no role for capital. Here the results appear
reasonable and there is no rejection of the model, but, as shown below
this specication too implies very high costs. Row 3 looks at the standard
(Pissarides-type) search and matching model with linear vacancy costs, such
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that 2 = 1; e1 = e31 = e32 = 1 = 2 = 0: The emerging estimates yield
a marginal cost series which is highly correlated with the one that emerges
from Row 2, but as will be shown below, implies even higher costs. More-
over, the parameter  is estimated at a high value (0:77).
The conclusions, thus far, are as follows: quadratic costs and linear
interaction of investment and hiring costs generate a good t of the data;
the bigger weight (0.6) is placed on the costs of hiring from non-employment,
with the remaining weight given equally to vacancy creation and to hiring
from other employment; the interactions between both types of hiring and
investment are signicant and negatively signed, implying complementarity
between investment and hiring (to be discussed below). In what follows I
shall refer to the results of row 1 in panel (a) as the preferred specication.
4.4 Implied Costs
The estimated costs are interesting and important by and of themselves, as
many models rely on their existence. Hence, the results of Table 2 merit
inspection for plausibility and the derivation of the time series for the fric-
tions they imply. This is done by constructing the time series for total and
marginal costs implied by the point estimates of the parameters of the g
function and relating them to what is known on these issues. Total costs are
presented in terms of percentage points out of GDP, gf : The marginal costs
of investment are compared to the price of investment,
gi
f
k
pI
f
k
= gi
pI
; so they
indicate how much the rm has to add in frictions costs to every dollar paid
for the investment good. The marginal costs of vacancies are compared to
the wage,
gv
q
f
n
w
f
n
=
gv
q
w ; so they indicate how much the rm pays for vacancy
creation and hiring in wage terms. Key moments are presented in Tables 3a
and 3b.
Table 3 a,b.
For the preferred estimates, total costs are about 2% of GDP on average,
with a standard deviation of 0.4%. Marginal investment costs add about 5%
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on average to the price pIt of a unit of capital. Marginal hiring costs are on
average 30% of quarterly wages, the equivalent of almost 4 weeks of wages.
Note that row 3, with the longer data sample, produces almost the same
numbers. These numbers constitute moderate or low costs estimates; Ap-
pendix C provides a comparison to the literature. The cubic specication of
row 2 in panel (a) has slightly higher total costs, lower marginal investment
costs, and higher vacancy creation marginal costs.
The implied costs of the standard specications, reported in panel (b),
are all unreasonable: for Tobins q for capital, for Tobins q for labor and
for the standard search and matching model they are all excessively high.
Overall, then, this section has presented an estimate of a quadratic costs
function of the frictions, with linear interaction between hiring and invest-
ment, which ts the data. The estimates imply complementarity between
hiring and investment and low costs. Standard specications, which per-
tain to one factor only capital or labor do not produce such reasonable
results.
5 Hiring, Investment and Their Present Values
This section examines the implications of the estimates for the relations of
hiring and investment with their values capital and job values. In what
follows, I will use both the terms vacancies (vt) and hiring (ht) and it should
be kept in mind that ht = qtvt; with the rm taking qt as given.
5.1 Vacancy and Investment Rates as Functions of the Present
Values
Taking equations (6)-(8), using the denitions of the derivatives of the g
function spelled out in Appendix A, and the results of row 1 in Table 2a,9the
following relations are derived:
9Whereby
1 = 2 = 2; 31 = 32 = 1
16
vt
nt
=
e1qt

1
(1  t)
QNt
ft
nt

   e31q1t + e32q2t  1(1  t) QKtft
kt
  pItft
kt

e1e22t  
 
e31q1t + e32q
2
t
2 (15)
it
kt
=
e2
2
t

1
(1  t)
QKt
ft
kt
  pItft
kt

  qt
 
e31q
1
t + e32q
2
t

1
(1  t)
QNt
ft
nt

e1e22t  
 
e31q1t + e32q
2
t
2 (16)
where:
t =

(1  1   2) + 1q1t + 2q2t

The estimates of Table 2 indicate that e1; e2 > 0; e31; e32 < 0 and
e1e2
2
t  
 
e31q
1
t + e32q
2
t
2
> 0:
The implications of these relations are that the vacancy and investment
rates, vtnt and
it
kt
; are positive functions of both their present values, QNt
and QKt (net of p
I
t ), taking into account taxes. It is therefore apparent that
models which ignore the present value of the other factor are mis-specied,
as e31 6= 0 and e32 6= 0.
Table 4 shows the rst and second moments of the decomposition of the
RHS of the equations in (15)-(16).
Table 4
In both cases, the cross e¤ects are substantial. Of the mean quarterly
vacancy rate of 2.8%, a fraction of 74% is due to the present value of hiring
term

e1qt

1
(1  t)
QNt
ft
nt

and the remaining 26% are due to the investment
term

   e31q1t + e32q2t  1(1  t) QKtft
kt
  pItft
kt

. The variance of the vacancy
rate (std of 0.5%) is decomposed in rows 2 and 3, which sum up to 1. The
investment term plays a substantial role its variance is bigger than that of
the hiring term and the co-variance of the two terms is substantial. Hence
and
e1e2  
 
e31q
1
t + e32q
2
t
 
(1  1   2) + 1q1t + 2q2t
2
> 0
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the results imply that the present value of investment plays a substantial
role in the determination of the volatility of hiring rates.
The mean quarterly investment rate of 2.6% is due to the present value
of hiring term (53%) and the present value of investment term (47%). The
variance of the investment rate (std of 0.2%) is decomposed into a smaller
part due to the hiring term and a bigger part played by the variance of
the investment term and a large (negative) co-variation with hiring. Hence
investment is heavily inuenced by hiring value both in terms of its mean
value and in terms of its volatility.
5.2 Negative Interaction Engenders Simultaneity
In Table 2a, the estimates of the coe¢ cients of the interaction terms, e31; e32
are negative. These negative point estimates imply a negative value for
gvi and, therefore, as can be seen in equations (15)-(16), a positive sign
for @( vtnt )=@

QKt
ft
kt

and for @( itkt )=@

QNt
ft
nt

: Note that @( itkt )=@

QKt
ft
kt

and
@( vtnt )=@

QNt
ft
nt

are positive due to convexity. Hence, when the marginal
value of investment Q
K
t
ft
kt
rises, both investment and vacancies/hiring rise.
A similar argument shows that they both rise when the marginal value of
vacanciesQ
N
t
ft
nt
rises.
The signs of these derivatives imply that for given levels of investment,
total and marginal costs of investment decline as vacancies increase. Sim-
ilarly, for given levels of vacancies, total and marginal costs of vacancies
decline as investment increases. This nding of complementarity between
investment and vacancies/hiring is to be expected as it implies that they
should be simultaneous. One interpretation of this result is that simultane-
ous hiring and investment is less costly than sequential hiring and investment
of the same magnitude. This may be due to the fact that simultaneous action
by the rm is less disruptive to production than sequential action.
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5.3 Capital and Job Values Across Models
Figure 1a presents a plot of the capital value. It equals estimated marginal
investment costs, dened as gitft
kt
. Figure 1b plots the value of a job, which
equals estimated marginal vacancy costs, dened as gvt
qt
ft
nt
. Both use the
preferred specication (row 1 of Table 2a). Figure 1a also shows the same
value according to the Tobins q model (row 1 in Table 2b) and Figure 1b
shows the same value according to the standard, search and matching model
(row 3 in Table 2b). NBER-dated recessions are shaded.
Figures 1a and b
In terms of the rst moment, as discussed in the preceding section and
shown in Table 3b, both the Tobins q model and the standard search and
matching model estimates imply very high marginal costs (read on the right
scale of the gures). For the former, these are on average 10% of the purchase
price of capital (pI): For the latter they are equivalent to about 31 weeks of
wages on average.10 In the current model, as shown in Table 3a, they are 4%
of the purchase price and equivalent to 4 weeks of wages, respectively. In
terms of second moments, the Tobins q estimates are correlated 0:37 with
the preferred estimates here; the standard search and matching model costs
are negatively correlated, at  0:57; with the values implied by the preferred
specication. The negative co-movement is highly apparent in the shaded
recession periods.
The reasons for these substantial di¤erences are as follows. The Tobins
q model and the standard matching model ignore the interaction with the
other factor (as they set e31 = e32 = 0). Moreover, the standard matching
model postulates linear costs that pertain to vacancies only. Essentially it
is (1  t)e2qt and its main variation comes from qt; the rm matching rate,
that appears in its denominator. The preferred specication in the current
model features convex costs that pertain to both investment ( itkt ) and hiring
(htnt ) rates (both from non-employment and job to job ows) as well as to
10See Table 3b.
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vacancy rates.11Hence the di¤erent models take very di¤erent stands on the
arguments of the investment and hiring frictions function and on its shape.
The cyclical implications of these di¤erences are further explored in Yashiv
(2014). Implications for recent U.S. experience are discussed in Section 7
below.
6 The Determinants of Capital and Job Values
I have derived, through structural estimation, the costs function (g), from
which one can derive the value of the job (i.e., the expected present value
of hiring (Q
N
f
n
)) and the value of capital (i.e., the expected present value
investment (Q
K
f
k
)). How are these values related to their expected future
determinants, given that both hiring and investment are forward-looking
variables? In other words, what in the future drives hiring and investment
today? In this section, I follow the empirical methodology of the asset
pricing literature in Finance and examine the present value relationships
governing hiring and investment. This involves the use of a forecasting VAR.
The analysis is based on the framework proposed by Campbell and Shiller
(1988) and its more recent elaboration by Cochrane (2011), whose notation
I follow.12 Note that I do not consider stock prices or any nancial data
here; rather, I apply the empirical framework developed in the cited Finance
literature to the current context. The results in the Finance literature do,
however, provide a natural benchmark against which to compare the current
results.13
11 It is given by
gvt
qt
ft
nt
= 1
qt
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h
(1 1 2)vt+1q1t vt+2q2t vt
nt
i2 1 
(1  1   2) + 1q1t + 2q2t

+e31q
1
t

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kt
31  q1t vt
nt
31 1
+e32q
2
t

it
kt
32  q2t vt
nt
32 1
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12The importance of this approach and its wider signicance was noted in the Nobel
Economics Prize for 2013 (see in particular pp.17-20 in Nobel Prize (2013)). This model
is often referred to as the dynamic, dividend-growth model. Cochrane (2011) provides a
discussion of empirical ndings and their implications for asset pricing.
13See Jermann (1998, 2010).
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6.1 An Asset Pricing Model
The model begins with the following two-period representation for the stock
price (P ) and dividends (D):
Pt = Et
 
R 1t+1[Dt+1 + Pt+1]

where R is the gross return. Iterated forward this yields:
Pt = Et
1X
j=1
  
jY
k=1
R 1t+k
!
Dt+j
!
(17)
These relationships hold true also ex-post if one denes the gross return as:
Rt+1  Dt+1 + Pt+1
Pt
(18)
Using logs, this asset pricing relationship can be approximated as:14
pt ' k + Et (pt+1 + (1  )dt+1   rt+1) (19)
Equation (19) is an ex-ante formulation using conditional expectations.
The ex-post equation, omitting the expectations operator Et in the above,
holds true as well, when using (18).
The current price (pt) is related to the future dividend (dt+1) and to the
future return (rt+1). The price will be higher when the future dividend is
higher and/or when the future return is lower.
6.2 Implementing the Forecasting Model for Hiring and In-
vestment
I cast the estimated model of hiring and investment into this asset pricing
framework by dening P and D for the optimal investment equation and
for the optimal hiring equation. The priceP is the value of capital or the
14where:
pt  lnPt; dt = lnDt; rt = lnRt  =
P
D
1 + P
D
and where P;D are steady state or long-term average values.
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value of jobs; this is essentially marginal q for capital investment (QK) and
marginal q for labor hiring (QN ), each divided by the relevant productivity
(fk or
f
n); the dividendD is the ow of net income from capital or from
labor. As shown below, additional terms come into play here. These prices
and dividendsare not observed on the market, as in the Finance literature.
Rather, they represent what the rm actually gets from its use of capital
and labor in production. Thus, the dividend in the investment case is
the net marginal productivity of capital; in the hiring case it is net labor
protability, i.e., the net marginal product of labor less the wage. These
dividends do not depend on institutional or nancial considerations of
rms as dividends do in the Finance context.
Dene:
P 1t  (1   t)
 
git + p
I
t
ft
kt
!
=
QKt
ft
kt
; D1t = (1   t)
(fkt   gkt)
ft
kt
; R1t =
G
f=k
t+1

(1  t)P 1t +D1t

P 1t 1
(20)
using Gf=kt+1 =
ft+1
kt+1
ft
kt
:
Comparing equation (20) to (18), one can see that two additional terms
in the current context are the one involving capital depreciation (t) and one
involving capital productivity growth (Gf=kt+1). Note, too, that D
1
t expresses
the share in capital productivity received by the rm, which without taxes
and investment costs would be
fkt
ft
kt
= 1   . The term Gf=kt+1 captures the
gross rate of growth of this productivity.
Appendix D shows that this formulation yields the following log-linear
approximation for log capital values:
p1t 1 = c2 + lnGf=kt + k ln(1  t) + kp1t + (1  k)d1t   r1t (21)
where small letters denote variables in logs and where k =
(1 )P1
D1
1+
(1 )P1
D1
:
For labor, dene:
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Comparing equation (22) to (18), one can see that two additional terms
in the current context are the one involving worker separations ( t) and one
involving labor productivity growth (Gf=nt+1). Note that D
2
t are the actual
prots from labor, once taxes, costs and wages have been deducted. The
term Gf=nt+1 captures the gross rate of growth of labor productivity. Appendix
D shows that this yields the following log-linear approximation of job values:
p2t 1 = c5 + lnG
f=n
t + 
n ln(1   t) + np2t + (1  n)d2t   r2t (23)
where n =
(1  )P2
D2
1+
(1  )P2
D2
:
6.3 Empirical Methodology
I use a restricted VAR to examine these relationships. Consider, rst, the
log-linear pricing equations in the non-stochastic steady state. These are
given by:
p1 = c2
1  k +
lnGf=k
1  k +
k
1  k ln(1  ) + d
1   r
1
1  k (24)
p2 ' c5
1  n +
lnGf=n
1  n +
n
1  n ln(1   ) + d
2   r
2
1  n (25)
These equations state that, in the non-stochastic steady state, the value
of capital (p1) and of jobs (p2) can each be decomposed (using log-linear
approximation) into parts due to dividends (d) or shares in net productivity,
returns (r), productivity growth (lnGf=k or lnGf=n) and deprecation () or
separation ( ).
Thus I estimate the following restricted structural VAR:
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xt+1 = A+Bxt + "t (26)
where xt+1 = (p1t+1; d
1
t+1; r
1
t+1; ln

G
f=k
t+1

; ln(1   t+1)) for capital, xt+1 =
(p2t+1; d
2
t+1; r
2
t+1; ln

G
f=n
t+1

; ln(1    t+1)) for labor, under the restrictions
implied by the steady state equations (24) and (25). Following estimation I
compute the relevant long run coe¢ cients (see Appendix D for a full deriva-
tion).
6.4 VAR Results
Table 5 reports the results of the VAR for selected coe¢ cients in the B
matrix and the implied long run coe¢ cients.
Table 5
For investment, a substantial role is played by returns (a long run coef-
cient of  1:15), while the other determinants have negligible e¤ects. Pro-
ductivity growth seems to have some e¤ect but it is imprecisely estimated.
The adjusted R2 of the return regression (that of r1 on the lagged values of
all the other variables) is not high, though at 0:23 it is higher than the value
reported in the Finance literature for return regressions using stock prices.
For hiring, the most substantial role is again played by returns (a long run
coe¢ cient of  0:73), and to some extent by labor protability, i.e., produc-
tivity less the wage (a long run coe¢ cient of 0:24). The other determinants
have much smaller e¤ects.
What, then, do we learn about the various future determinants of in-
vestment and hiring values?
First, returns play the dominant role, as also found in the empirical
Finance literature. Their VAR coe¢ cients (br_p1 and br_p2) are precisely
estimated and the implied long run coe¢ cients are sizeable. The adjusted
R2 in the investment case of the return regression (0:23) is higher than
that of regressions in Finance while for hiring it is even much higher (0:39).
Note that these coe¢ cients are negative, implying that a rise in log prices is
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associated with future declines in returns (r), for both investment and hiring,
i.e., high prices predict low subsequent returns, as found in the Finance
literature. A similar result is obtained when computing the relation between
the log price-dividend ratio (p   d) of investment and of hiring with their
subsequent returns. This result has also been observed for stock prices and
dividends and for house prices and rents (see Cochrane (2011, pp. 1051-
1052)).
Second,dividends in the way dened here labor protability play
a role in the hiring case, although a smaller one than returns. In this case,
higher prices are associated with subsequent higher labor protability and
the adjusted R2 is very high (0:95). Productivity does not play a signicant
role in the capital case.
Third, productivity growth, does not appear to play a role in both cases:
the VAR coe¢ cients (bgk_p1 and bgn_p2) are not signicantly di¤erent from
zero. This is akin to the nding in Finance that dividend growth does not
matter much.
Fourth, investment values are highly persistent (as measured by 1 =
0:97), which is consistent with the ndings of the Finance literature. Job
values are somewhat less persistent (2 = 0:73):
Fifth, the rates of separation and depreciation do not play a meaningful
role; the coe¢ cients are not signicantly di¤erent from zero. This means
that the variable that determines the length of the hire ( determines job
duration) does not have much e¤ect on the value of the hire, relative to the
other determinants. It is the discounting of future streams which plays the
overwhelming role.
7 U.S. Labor Market Experience
In this section I use the model of vacancy creation and hiring studied here to
examine broader labor market phenomena. I embed the afore-going set-up
in a matching framework which facilitates the analysis of unemployment,
including the recent Great Recession experience. The essential idea is to
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incorporate the rmsF.O.C complete with the investment interaction 
into a standard search and matching model of vacancies and unemployment.
Using a conventional matching function and the afore-going estimates, I
relate the models steady state formulations to U.S. data and then analyze
recent U.S. experience.
This exercise uses the estimates of Table 2 to embed the vacancy and
investment F.O.C. in a wider framework, albeit still a partial equilibrium
one. By calibrating the parameters using the GMM estimates and employing
data averages, the steady state of this framework is derived and compared to
actual data using graphical analysis. This allows one to see how movements
in the data over the sample period may be approximated by movements in
the models steady state curves over sub-periods. The changes in unem-
ployment and vacancies over time can be understood in terms of changes in
variables that are at the focus of the analysis job and capital values. I then
compare the results of the current model to those implied by the standard
search and matching model.
7.1 Incorporating the Analysis in a Matching Framework
Following Pissarides (2000), a matching function denes the hiring rate:
There are two CRS functions for each of the hiring ows:
h1t
nt
= 1

ut
nt
  vt
nt
1 
(27)
h2t
nt
= 2

tnt
nt
  vt
nt
1 
(28)
where t is the fraction of employed workers that are searching for work in
another rm. As noted above, h2t =  
2
t :
The rm matching rates are given by:
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In the steady state the two FOC are given by:
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In steady state equilibrium, the ows from and to non-employment are
equal so:
1
 v
n
1  u
n

=  1 + g (34)
Within employment ows satisfy:
2
 v
n
1 
() =  2 (35)
where g is the rate of growth of the labor force (n+ u).
The solution to (32),(33), (34) and (35) determines ik ;
v
n ;
u
n and :
Making use of the formulation of a quadratic-linear costs function (1 =
2 = 2 and 31 = 32 = 1) and using (32), I get
i
k
=
1
e1
"
1
(1  )
QK
f
k
  p
I
f
k
  (e31q1 + e32q2) v
n
#
(36)
which can be substituted into (33). The steady state equilibrium can thus
be presented as follows:
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Substituting (39) into (37), this yields the following two equations, to be
plotted in un and
v
n space:
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)
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n
(40)
1
 v
n
1  u
n

=  1 + g (41)
Using (40), the vacancy creation curve, and (41), the steady state ows
curve, one solves for un and
v
n given the steady state values of the variables
1
(1 )
QN
f
n
; 1(1 )
QK
f
k
 pIf
k
;  1;  2; g and the parameter values e1; e2; e31; e32; 1; 2; 1; 2
and :
Note that term Beveridge curveis often used to denote the empirical
relationship between v and u (see Yashiv (2008)). In the search and match-
ing literature, this term is typically used to designate the steady state ows
equation, given here by (41).
7.2 Graphical Analysis
Figure 2 presents a plot of these curves in un   vn space, together with data
points that will be described shortly.
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Figure 2
The gure depicts two downward-sloping curves:
a. The steady state ows curve (41) is downward-sloping because as un
rises vn needs to fall to keep the same hiring ow out of unemployment to
match a given ow into unemployment (determined by  1 + g).
b. The vacancy creation curve (40) is also downward-sloping for the
following reason: when the unemployment rate un rises, the matching rates
q and q1 rise as rms face a bigger pool of searching workers. This has
two contradictory e¤ects on the rms behavior: it lowers vacancy duration
1
q ; thereby reducing the cost of vacancies, which operates to increase the
vacancy rate. At the same time, for any given vacancy rate vn ; more hires
are made (with hn = q
v
n): With convex costs of training, the rm gets lower
prots from the marginal hire, which operates to lower the optimal vacancy
rate. It turns out that, for the estimated parameter values, the latter e¤ect
is dominant and vacancy rates vn go down. When job values (
1
(1 )
QN
f
n
) or
capital values ( 1(1 )
QK
f
k
  pIf
k
) go up, the vacancy creation curve moves up,
towards a higher rate of vacancy creation.
To o¤er some comparison, I repeat this exercise for the standard search
and matching model. Figure 3 shows the same curves in a prototypical
Pissarides (2000) model, which may be compared to Figure 2 of the current
model.
Figure 3
Essentially the curve of the steady state ows equation (41) remains the
same across models. But the equation for vacancy creation in the steady
state, using the same matching function, is given by:
c
q
=
1
(1  )
QNsearch
f
n
(42)
c
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n
u
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 
+ 2 ()
 
v
n
  = 1(1  )QNsearchf
n
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This is an upward sloping curve in un   vn space.15A rise in un lowers va-
cancy duration, decreases costs and thus increases vacancy rates. There are
no o¤setting convex training costs. Here, too, the curve moves up towards
higher vacancy creation when job values ( 1(1 )
QNsearch
f
n
) rise:
7.3 Relating the Models to U.S. Data
I now relate the steady state relationships (40) and (41) in the current model
(Figure 2), and equations (42) and (41) in the standard model (Figure 3),
to the actual data. The idea is to nd a region in un   vn space where these
equations are a reasonable approximation of the steady state around which
the data points are scattered. This is a stylized exercisewhich needs to
be understood as such.
In order to do so one needs to use the relevant unemployment pool ut.
The hiring series (h1t ) used here includes worker ows to employment from
both the out of the labor force pool and the o¢ cial unemployment pool. I
examine three alternative formulations for ut: in one it is the o¢ cial unem-
ployment pool; in a second, it is the o¢ cial unemployment pool plus mar-
ginally attached workers; and in a third it is the o¢ cial unemployment pool
plus workers who want a job.Using these variables, and a vacancy series,
Figure 2 plots the data points (together with the steady state equations) in
u
n   vn space for o¢ cial unemployment. Appendix E, which elaborates on
the data and the procedure, does the same for the other two formulations
of unemployment. Figure 2 shows actual U.S. data points of un and
v
n over
the sample period divided into two sub-periods: 1994 - 2006 and 2007-2013.
Table 6 presents average values of all relevant variables in these sub-periods
using the o¢ cial unemployment pool. Appendix E does the same for the
other two formulations of unemployment.
Table 6
The data points are fairly well distributed around the steady state curves.
15Note, that it does not start at the origin because of the job to job ow term
2 ()
 
v
n
 
in (42).
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By construction, the intersection of the curves lies at the relevant sub-sample
average. It turns out that the analysis of the other two non-employment
pools yields the same qualitative conclusions. Figure 2 and Table 6, as well as
the gures and tables in Appendix E, suggest the following interpretation of
U.S. labor market developments: in the Great Recession, both curves shifted
up. The outcome was that the unemployment rate increased considerably
while the vacancy rate fell somewhat.
The emerging partial equilibrium storyis as follows. Going from 1994-
2006 to 2007- 2013 the vacancy creation curve (40) moved up due to a rise in
job values 11 
QN
f
n
and in capital values 1(1 )
QK
f
k
  pIf
k
: The intuition is clear:
the higher the job value, the higher is vacancy creation, and the curve for the
latter moves up. The less intuitive aspect is the rise in job values in a period
marked by a recession. In Yashiv (2014), I show that job values behave
counter-cyclically, reecting expected future job protability (as opposed to
current protability). The steady state ows curve (41) went up too, due to
the rise in the separation rate  1; and despite a decline in the labor force
growth rate g: Overall the following took place: the unemployment rate (un)
rose, as did the rate of hiring from non-employment (h
1
n ) and the separation
rate  1; vacancy rates ( vn) fell and so did job to job movements (seen by
the decline in  2 in Table 6).
How do these same un   vn developments look in the standard search and
matching model? Figure 3 features the data points in the same way, as does
Appendix E for the other non-employment pools. In this standard model,
job values QNsearch go down, which can be seen in Table 6. Therefore the
vacancy creation curve underlying (42) moves down, implying lower vacancy
creation for a given rate of unemployment. With the further move in the
ows curve (41), for the same reason as above, equilibrium moves to a higher
rate of unemployment. The increase in the ow into unemployment (higher
 1) needs to be balanced by the outow from unemployment and vacancy
rates rise too, though not as far as the initial rate.
Note, then, the di¤erence between the current model and the standard
model in accounting for the same developments in the data: in the current
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model the job value has gone up (as well as the capital value) while in the
standard model it has gone down. Both of these movements in job values
may be seen in Figure 1 of Section 5.3 above. Hence, while both models
can account for the developments in un and
v
n space, they attribute di¤erent
reasons to the changes that took place. The reason for the di¤erences lies in
the formulation of hiring frictions. The standard model has linear (2 = 1)
costs, which depend only on vacancy rates (no capital interaction), and
the ensuing marginal costs function depends mainly on vu (see the LHS of
(42)). In the current model, costs are convex (1 = 2 = 2) and are a
function of the three elements of the recruiting process ( vn ;
q1v
n ;
q2v
n ); as well
as the interaction with investment rates ( ik ).
16So while the standard model
has vacancy duration (1q ) as the only element driving uctuations in costs,
the current model adds to this element also hiring and investment rates.
Note that the standard model is a special case of the current model (with
e1 = e31 = e32 = 0; 1 = 2 = 0 and 2 = 1) and in estimation has yielded
parameter estimates indicating excessively high vacancy costs.
8 Conclusions
The key notions in this paper are the forward-looking aspect of investment
and hiring and their joint determination. More specically, the results indi-
cate three sets of key implications:
One is the complementarity between hiring and investment and substan-
tial cross-e¤ects the rst and second moments of the hiring rate are heavily
inuenced by the present value of investment and vice versa. Estimated job
values here were shown to di¤er from those implied by the standard search
and matching model. A second, is that the main determinants of these capi-
tal values and job values are future returns, in line with what has been found
in the Finance literature for asset prices. The third is that U.S. labor market
experience, including the rise in unemployment in the Great Recession, can
be depicted in a stylized way using the estimated model.
16As can be seen on the LHS of (40).
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This paper, intentionally, did not specify a full DSGE model. This was
done in order to focus on rms investment and hiring decisions and not
let the analysis be a¤ected by possible mis-specications or problematics in
other parts of the macroeconomy. To account for rm investment and hiring
behavior, one does not need to get into issues such as optimal intertemporal
consumption and labor choices of the individual, with all the associated em-
pirical di¢ culties. However this precludes the analysis of structural shocks.
In current research, Faccini and Yashiv (2015) take up such a model in an
attempt to map the linkages between the structural shocks to the economy
and the di¤erential evolution of the relevant present values.
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Table 1
Descriptive Sample Statistics
Quarterly, U.S. data
a. 1976:1-2013:4 (n = 152)
Variable fk 
i
k 
wn
f
h1
n
v
n  
1 
Mean 0:14 0:38 0:024 0:02 0:62 0:126 0:031 0:125 0:99
Standard Deviation 0:01 0:05 0:003 0:003 0:02 0:010 0:007 0:010 0:005
b. 1994:1-2013:4 (n = 80)
Variable fk 
i
k 
wn
f
h
n =
h1+h2
n
v
n  =  
1 +  2
Mean 0:15 0:34 0:026 0:02 0:61 0:178 0:028 0:178
Standard Deviation 0:01 0:005 0:002 0:002 0:03 0:012 0:005 0:012

Mean 0:99
Standard Deviation 0:005
i
Table 2a
GMM estimates
Current Model
specication e1 e2 e31 e32  J-Statistic
1 benchmark 77:3 9:1  2:8  19:6 0:66 51:6
(6:29) (0:98) (1:2) (0:9) (0:003) (0:74)
2 cubic 124:7 101:5 2:6  3:6 0:62 57:7
1 = 2 = 3 (69:5) (10:2) (1:8) (0:8) (0:005) (0:52)
3 constrained case 30:8 1:96  1:3 0 0:65 83:6
2 = e32 = 0;1 = 1 (6:3) (0:29) (0:9)     (0:31)
1976  2013
Table 2b
GMM estimates, Standard Specications
specication e1 e2 e31 e32  J-Statistic
1 Tobins q for K 49:4 0 0 0 0:63 60:0
(2:6)       (0:0009) (0:51)
2 Tobins q for N 0 30:8 0 0 0:70 61:9
  (0:9)     (0:003) (0:48)
3 Standard matching model 0 9:3 0 0 0:77 62:5
2 = 1; 1 = 2 = 0   (0:1)     (0:002) (0:46)
Notes:
1. The tables report point estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
The J-statistic is reported with p value in parentheses.
2. The following parameter values are set unless indicated otherwise:
1 = 0:6;2 = 0:2; 1 = 2 = 2; 31 = 32 = 1.
ii
3. The instrument set for both equations is

wt
ft
nt
; itkt ; p
I
t

; for the invest-
ment equation also
ft+1
kt+1
ft
kt
is used;and for the vacancies equation also htnt is
used; all with lags 1 to 6, 8 and 10.
4. The sample period is 1994:1 2013:4, except for Row 3 in Table 2a
where it is 1976:1-2013:4.
iii
Table 3a
Costs Implied by the GMM Estimation Results
Current Model
specication gf
gi
pI
gv
qw
mean std. mean std. mean std.
1 benchmark 0:02 0:004 0:05 0:01 0:30 0:08
2 cubic 0:03 0:002 0:02 0:003 0:68 0:05
1 = 2 = 3
3 constrained case 0:02 0:002 0:04 0:01 0:35 0:03
2 = e32 = 0;1 = 1
1976  2013
Table 3b
Costs Implied by the GMM Estimation Results
Standard Specications
specication gf
gi
pI
gv
qw
mean std. mean std. mean std.
1 Tobins q for K 0:02 0:003 0:10 0:01    
2 Tobins q for N 0:12 0:01     2:24 0:14
3 Standard matching model 0:26 0:01     2:44 0:37
2 = 1; 1 = 2 = 0
Notes:
1. Mean and std. refer to sample statistics.
2. The functions were computed using the point estimates in Tables 2
a,b.
iv
Table 4
Decomposition of the Vacancy Rate and Investment Rate
Equations
First Two Moments
vt
nt
=
e1qt

1
(1  t)
QNt
ft
nt

   e31q1t + e32q2t  1(1  t) QKtft
kt
  pItft
kt

e1e22t  
 
e31q1t + e32q
2
t
2
it
kt
=
e2
2
t

1
(1  t)
QKt
ft
kt
  pItft
kt

  qt
 
e31q
1
t + e32q
2
t

1
(1  t)
QNt
ft
nt

e1e22t  
 
e31q1t + e32q
2
t
2
where:
t =

(1  1   2) + 1q1t + 2q2t

a. Vacancy (hiring) Equation
1 2
vt
nt
e1qt
 
1
(1 t)
QNt
ft
nt
!
e1e22t (e31q1t+e32q2t )
2
 (e31q1t+e32q2t )
 
1
(1 t)
QKt
ft
kt
  p
I
t
ft
kt
!
e1e22t (e31q1t+e32q2t )
2
1 mean 0:028 relative mean 0:74 0:26
2 std 0:005 relative var 0:28 0:38
3 relative cova 0:17
v
b. Investment Equation
1 2
it
kt
e22t
 
1
(1 t)
QKt
ft
kt
  p
I
t
ft
kt
!
e1e22t (e31q1t+e32q2t )
2
 qt(e31q1t+e32q2t )
 
1
(1 t)
QNt
ft
nt
!
e1e22t (e31q1t+e32q2t )
2
1 mean 0:026 relative mean 0:47 0:53
2 std 0:002 relative var 1:84 0:90
3 relative cova  0:87
Notes:
1. Row 1 reports the mean vacancy or investment rate and the relative
means of the two decomposition terms indicated in columns 1 and 2 (which
sum to 1).
2. Row 2 reports the std. of the vacancy or investment rate and the
relative variances of the two decomposition terms indicated in columns 1
and 2 (i.e., var term1total var ;
var term2
total var ).
3. Row 3 reports the relative co-variance of the two decomposition terms
indicated in columns 1 and 2 (i.e., co-var term1,term2total var ).
4. All results are based on the point estimates of row 1 in Table 2a.
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Table 5
VAR Results
Investment
coef. std. R2 LR coef.
1 0:965 0:025 0:95
bd_p1  0:002 0:012 0:93  0:001
br_p1  0:070 0:019 0:23  1:151
bgk_p1  0:009 0:023 0:23  0:154
b_p1 0:0002 0:0003 0:999 0:004
Vacancies/Hiring
coef. std. R2 LR coef.
2 0:725 0:102 0:82
bd_p2 0:409 0:147 0:95 0:244
br_p2  0:351 0:089 0:39  0:726
bgn_p2 0:014 0:013  0:05 0:029
b _p2 0:001 0:007 0:07 0:001
Notes:
1. The VAR formulation is given in Section 6.3, with full derivation
provided in Appendix D.
2. The relevant long run coe¢ cients, for capital are:
blrgk_p1 =
bgk_p1
1  k1
; blr_p1 =
kb_p1
1  k1
blrd_p1 =
(1  k)bd_p1
1  k1
; blrr_p1 =
br_p1
1  k1
For labor:
vii
blrgn_p2 =
bgn_p2
1  n2
; blr _p2 =
nb _p2
1  n2
blrd_p2 =
(1  n)bd_p2
1  n2
; blrr_p2 =
br_p2
1  n2
where 1 is the AR coe¢ cient on p
1; 2 is the AR coe¢ cient on p
2the b_p1;2
are the coe¢ cients w.r.t p1;2 and lr denotes the long-run.
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Table 6
Variables in the un   vn Analysis of Figures 2 and 3
Sample Averages
1994  2006 2007  2013
v
n 0:0299 0:0255
u
n 0:054 0:083
1
(1 )
QK
f
k
  pIf
k
0:36 0:72
1
1 
QN
f
n
0:16 0:22
1
(1 )
QNsearch
f
n
1:485 1:447
 1 0:117 0:120
 2 0:068 0:044
g 0:003 0:0006
Notes:
1. For the full computation methodology of the solution depicted in
Figures 2 and 3 see Appendix E.
2. The rate of unemployment un here pertains to the o¢ cial unemploy-
ment pool. For the other non-employment pools see Appendix E.
3. The numbers are data averages except for the values of 1(1 )
QK
f
k
  pIf
k
in the current model and of 1(1 )
QNsearch
f
n
in the standard model, which are
solved out of the steady state equations.
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Figure 2
Unemployment-Vacancies Analysis 1994-2013
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Notes:
1. The solid lines are the vacancy creation curves as in equation (40)
and the dashed lines are the steady state ows curve as in equation (41).
2. The blue lines pertain to the period 1994-2006. The red lines pertain
to the period 2007-2013.
3. The circles are the actual data points with the same colors indicating
the periods.
xi
Figure 3
Unemployment-Vacancies Analysis of the Standard Search and
Matching Model
1994-2013
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Notes: As in Figure 3, except that the vacancy creation curve is given
by equation (42).
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1 Appendix A
The Cost Function and its Derivatives
g() =
2664
e1
1
( itkt )
1
+ e22
h
(1 1 2)vt+1q1t vt+2q2t vt
nt
i2
+ e3131

it
kt
q1t vt
nt
31
+ e3232

it
kt
q2t vt
nt
32
3775 f(zt; nt; kt): (1)
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"
e1(
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)1 1
+e31

q1t vt
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31
( itkt )
31 1 + e32

q2t vt
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32
( itkt )
32 1
#
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gvt
ft
nt
=
266664
e2
h
(1 1 2)vt+1q1t vt+2q2t vt
nt
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+e31q
1
t

it
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31  q1t vt
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2 Appendix B
The Data
variable symbol denition
GDP f gross value added of NFCB
GDP deator pf price per unit of gross value added of NFCB
wage share wnf numerator: compensation of employees in NFCB
discount rate r the rate of non-durable consumption growth minus 1
employment n employment in nonnancial corporate business sector
hiring h gross hires
separation rate  gross separations divided by employment
vacancies v adjusted Help Wanted Index
investment i gross investment in NFCB sector
capital stock k stock of private nonresidential xed assets in NFCB sector
depreciation  depreciation of the capital stock
price of capital goods pI real price of new capital goods
variable symbol source
GDP f NIPA accounts, table 1.14, line 41
GDP deator pf NIPA table 1.15, line 1
wage share wnf NIPA; see note 7
discount rate r NIPA Table 2.3.3, lines 3, 8, and 13; see note 1
employment n CPS; see note 2
hiring h CPS; see note 3
separation rate  CPS; see note 3
vacancies v Conference Board; see note 4
investment i BEA and Fed Flow of Funds; see note 5
capital stock k BEA and Fed Flow of Funds; see note 5
depreciation  BEA and Fed Flow of Funds; see note 5
price of capital goods pI NIPA and U.S. tax foundation; see note 6
The sample period is 1976:2-2013:4 unless noted otherwise; all data are quar-
terly.
Notes:
1. The discount rate and the discount factor
The discount rate is based on a DSGE-type model with logarithmic utility
U(ct) = ln ct. Dene the discount factor as t  11+rt
In this model:
U 0(ct) = U 0(ct+1)  (1 + rt) (6)
Hence:
t =
ct
ct+1
(7)
2
where c is non-durable consumption (goods and services) and 5% of durable
consumption.
2. Employment
As a measure of employment in the nonnancial corporate business sec-
tor (n) I take wage and salary workers in non-agricultural industries (series
ID LNS12032187) less government workers (series ID LNS12032188), less self-
employed workers (series ID LNS12032192). All series originate from CPS data-
bases. I do not subtract workers in private households (the unadjusted series
ID LNU02032190) from the above due to lack of su¢ cient data on this variable.
3. Hiring and Separation Rates
The aggregate ow from non-employment unemployment (U) and out of
the labor force (O) to employment is to be denoted OE + UE and the sepa-
ration rate  t is rate of the ow in the opposite direction, EU + EO. Worker
ows within employment i.e., job to job ows are to be denoted EE:
I denote:
h
n
=

h1
n

+

h2
n

(8)
h1
n
=
OE + UE
E
h2
n
=
EE
E
Hence h1 and h2 denote ows from non-employment and from other employ-
ment, respectively.
Separation rates are given by:
 =  1 +  2 (9)
 1 =
EO + EU
E
 2 =
EE
E
=
h2
n
Employment dynamics now satises:
nt+1 = (1   1t    2t )nt + h1t + h2t (10)
= (1   t)nt + ht; 0   t  1
h2t =  
2
t
To calculate hiring and separation rates for the whole economy I use the
following:
a. The h1t and  
1
t ows. I compute the ows between E (employment), U
(unemployment) and O (not-in-the-labor-force) that correspond to the E,U,O
3
stocks published by the CPS. The methodology of adjusting ows to stocks is
taken from BLS, and is presented in Frazis et al (2005).1The data till 1990:Q1
were kindly provided by Ofer Cornfeld. The data from 1990:Q2 onwards were
taken from the CPS (http://www.bls.gov/cps/cps_ows.htm). Employment is
the quarterly average of the original seasonally adjusted total employment series
from BLS (LNS12000000).
b. The h2t and  
2
t ows. The data on EE, available only from 1994:Q1
onward, were computed by multiplying the percentage of people moving from
one employer to another using Fallick and Fleischman (2004)s2data by the
NSA population series LNU00000000, taken from the CPS, completing several
missing observations and performing seasonal adjustment.
4. Vacancies
I use the vacancies series based on the Conference Board Composite Help-
Wanted Index that takes into account both printed and web job advertisements,
as computed by Barnichon. The updated series is available at
https://sites.google.com/site/regisbarnichon/research/publications.
This index was multiplied by a constant to adjust its mean to the mean of the
JOLTS vacancies series over the overlapping sample period (2001:Q12013:Q4)
5. Investment, capital and depreciation
The goal here is to construct the quarterly series for real investment ow it,
real capital stock kt , and depreciation rates t. I proceed as follows:
 Construct end-of-year xed-cost net stock of private nonresidential xed
assets in NFCB sector, Kt . In order to do this I use the quantity index
for net stock of xed assets in NFCB (FAA table 4.2, line 37, BEA) as
well as the 2009 current-cost net stock of xed assets (FAA table 4.1, line
37, BEA).
 Construct annual xed-cost depreciation of private nonresidential xed
assets in NFCB sector, Dt . The chain-type quantity index for depreciation
originates from FAA table 4.5, line 37. The current-cost depreciation
estimates (and specically the 2009 estimate) are given in FAA table 4.4,
line 37.
 Calculate the annual xed-cost investment ow, It:
It = Kt  Kt 1 +Dt
 Calculate implied annual depreciation rate, a:
1Frazis, Harley J., Edwin L. Robison, Thomas D. Evans and Martha A. Du¤, 2005. Esti-
mating Gross Flows Consistent with Stocks in the CPS, Monthly Labor Review, Septem-
ber, 3-9.
2Fallick and Fleischman, 2004. Employer-to-Employer Flows in the U.S. Labor Market:
The Complete Picture of Gross Worker Flows,FEDS #2004-34.
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a =
It   (Kt  Kt 1)
Kt 1 + It=2
 Calculate implied quarterly depreciation rate for each year, qt:
q + (1  q)q + (1  q)2q + (1  q)3q = a
 Take historic-cost quarterly investment in private non-residential xed as-
sets by NFCB sector from the Flow of Funds accounts, atabs les, series
FA105013005).
 Deate it using the investment price index (the latter is calculated as
consumption of xed capital in domestic NFCB in current dollars (NIPA
table 1.14, line 18) divided by consumption of xed capital in domestic
NFCB in chained 2009 dollars (NIPA table 1.14, line 42). This procedure
yields the implicit price deator for depreciation in NFCB. The resulting
quarterly series, it_unadj, is thus in real terms.
 Perform Dentons procedure to adjust the quarterly series it_unadj from
the Federal Flow of Funds accounts to the implied annual series from BEA
It, using the depreciation rate qt from above. I use the simplest version of
the adjustment procedure, when the discrepancies between the two series
are equally spread over the quarters of each year. As a result of adjustment
I get the xedcost quarterly series it.
 Simulate the quarterly real capital stock series kt starting from k0 (k0 is
actually the xed-cost net stock of xed assets in the end of 1975, this
value is taken from the series Kt) , using the quarterly depreciation series
qt and investment series it from above:
kt+1 = kt  (1  qt) + it
6. Real price of new capital goods
In order to compute the real price of new capital goods, pI , I use the price
indices for output and for investment goods.
Investment in NFCB Inv consists of equipment Eq and structures St as well
as intellectual property, which I do not include. I dene the time-t price-indices
for good j = Eq; St as epjt : The data are taken from NIPA table 1.1.4, lines 10,
11.
I take from http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/frbus/us-models-package.htm
the following tax -related rates:
a. The parameter  the statutory corporate income tax rate as reported
by the U.S. Tax Foundation.
b. The investment tax credit on equipment and public utility structures, to
be denoted ITC.
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c. The percentage of the cost of equipment that cannot be depreciated if the
rm takes the investment tax credit, denoted .
d. The present discounted value of capital depreciation allowances, denoted
ZPDESt and ZPDEEq:
I then apply the following equations:
pEq = epEq (1  Eq)
pSt = epSt (1  St) ;
1  St =
 
1   ZPDESt
1  
1  Eq = 1  ITC   ZPDE
Eq (1  ITC)
1  
Subsequently I compute their change between t 1 and t (denoted by pjt ) :
pInvt
pInvt 1
= !t
pEqt
pEqt 1
+ (1  !t) p
St
t
pStt 1
where
!t =
(nominal expenditure share of Eq in Inv)t 1
+ (nominal expenditure share of Eq in Inv)t
2
:
The weights !t are calculated from the NIPA table 1.1.5, lines 9,11.
I divide the series by the price index for output, pft , to obtain the real price
of new capital goods, pI .
As all of these prices are indices, in estimation I estimate a scaling parameter
ea:
7. Labor share
NIPA table 1.14, line 20 (compensation of employees in NFCB) divided by
line 17 in the same table (gross value added in NFCB).
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3 Appendix C
Comparison of the Costs Estimates to the Literature
3.1 Vacancy and Hiring Costs
Mortensen and Nagypal (2006, page 30)3 note that Although there is a consen-
sus that hiring costs are important, there is no authoritative estimate of their
magnitude. Still, it is reasonable to assume that in order to recoup hiring costs,
the rm needs to employ a worker for at least two to three quarters. When
wages are equal to their median level in the standard model (w = 0:983); hiring
costs of this magnitude correspond to less than a week of wages. The widely-
cited Shimer (2005) paper4 calibrates these costs at cq = 0:16 using a linear cost
function, which is equivalent to 3.4 weeks of wages. Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008)5 decompose this cost into two components: (i) the capital ow cost of
posting a vacancy; they compute it to be  in steady state  47.4 percent of
the average weekly labor productivity; (ii) the labor cost of hiring one worker,
which, relying on micro-evidence, they compute to be 3 percent to 4.5 percent
of quarterly wages of a new hire. The rst component would correspond to a
gure of 0:037 here; the second component would correspond to a range of 0:02
to 0:03 in the terms used here; together this implies 0:057 to 0:067 in current
terms or around 1.1 to 1.3 weeks of wages. Note that the estimates for the
preferred specication, i.e., the GMM results reported in row 1 of Tables 2a
and 3a, pertain to marginal costs with a convex costs function, while most of
the above pertain to average costs, usually with a linear function.The preferred
specication here has an estimate of gvq which is 0:19 at its sample average and
this is the equivalent of almost 4 weeks of wages.
3.2 Investment Costs
The q literature exhibits huge variation across studies over four decades. One
nds estimates of marginal costs varying from as low as 0:04 to as high as 60
(in terms of fk ). These di¤erences in marginal cost estimates are usually due
to di¤erences in the parameter estimates, and not just due to the diversity in
the rate of investment used. One can divide the results into three sets: (i) the
earlier studies, from the 1980s, suggested high costs, whereby marginal costs
range between 3 to 60 in terms of average output per unit of capital and the
implied total costs range between 15% to 100% of output; (ii) more recent
studies report moderate costs, whereby marginal costs are around 1 in terms of
average output per unit of capital and total costs range between 0:5% to 6%
of output; (iii) micro-based studies, using cross-sectional or panel data, report
3Mortensen, Dale T. and Eva Nagypal, 2006. More on Vacancy and Unemployment
Fluctuations,working paper.
4Shimer, Robert, 2005. The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacan-
cies,American Economic Review, 95,1, 25-49.
5Hagedorn, Marcus, and Iourii Manovskii, 2008. The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium
Unemployment and Vacancies Revisited,American Economic Review, 98, 4, 16921706.
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low costs, whereby marginal costs are 0:04 to 0:50 of average output per unit of
capital and total costs range between 0:1% to 0:2% of output.
The results for the preferred specication, i.e., the GMM results reported in
row 1 of Tables 2a and 3a, have marginal costs as a fraction of output per unit
of capital ( gif
k
) estimated at a mean of 0.58. This corresponds to the high part
of the third set, of low costs.
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4 Appendix D
Derivation and VAR Estimation of the Asset Pricing Model
4.1 Investment in Capital
Dene:
P 1t  (1   t)
 
git + p
I
t
ft
kt
!
=
QKt
ft
kt
(11)
D1t = (1   t)
(fkt   gkt)
ft
kt
(12)
R1t =

1 + g
f=k
t
 
(1  t)P 1t +D1t

P 1t 1
(13)
Using:
G
f=k
t+1 =
ft+1
kt+1
ft
kt
Hence:
R1t =
G
f=k
t

(1  t)P 1t +D1t

P 1t 1
= G
f=k
t
D1t (1 +
(1 t)P 1t
D1t
)
P 1t 1
lnR1t = ln

G
f=k
t

+ ln

D1t (1 +
(1  t)P 1t
D1t
)

  lnP 1t 1
Looking into the second term:
ln

D1t (1 +
(1  t)P 1t
D1t
)

= lnD1t + ln(1 +
(1  t)P 1t
D1t
)
= lnD1t + ln(1 + e
ln(1 t)+p1t d1t )
= d1t + c0 + k
 
ln(1  t) + p1t   d1t

where:
9
k =
(1 )P 1
D1
1 + (1 )P
1
D1
Hence:
lnR1t
= c1 + ln

G
f=k
t

+ d1t + c0 + 
k
 
ln(1  t) + p1t   d1t
  p1t 1
So:
p1t 1 = c2 + lnGf=kt + k ln(1  t) + kp1t + (1  k)d1t   r1t (14)
4.2 Hiring of Labor
Dene:
P 2t 
(1   t) gvt
ft
nt
qt
 Q
N
t
ft
nt
(15)
D2t = (1   t)
 
  gnt
ft
nt
  wt
ft
nt
!
(16)
R2t =

1 + g
f=n
t
 
(1   t)P 2t +D2t

P 2t 1
(17)
where:
G
f=n
t+1 =
ft+1
nt+1
ft
nt
Hence:
R2t =
G
f=n
t

(1   t)P 2t +D2t

P 2t 1
=
G
f=n
t D
2
t
h
1 +
(1  t)P 2t
D2t
i
P 2t 1
lnR2t = lnG
f=n
t
+ lnD2t
+ ln

1 +
(1   t)P 2t
D2t

  lnP 2t 1
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Looking into the fourth term on the RHS:
ln

1 +
(1   t)P 2t
D2t

= ln(1  eln((1  t)+p2t d2t )
= c3 + n(ln(1   t) + p2t   d2t )
where
n =
(1  )P 2
D2
1 + (1  )P
2
D2
Collecting all terms:
lnR2t
= c4 + lnGf=nt + d2t + c3 + n(ln(1   t) + p2t   d2t )  p2t 1
So:
p2t 1 = c5 + lnG
f=n
t + 
n ln(1   t) + np2t + (1  n)d2t   r2t (18)
4.3 The VAR
I estimate the following structural VAR:
(xt+1) = A+Bxt + "t
For capital
xt+1 =
0BBBBB@
p1t+1
d1t+1
r1t+1
ln

G
f=k
t+1

ln(1  t+1)
1CCCCCA
The structural restrictions implied by (14):6
e1(I   kB) =
 
(1  k)e2   e3 + e4 + ke5

B (19)
For labor:
6where
e1 = (1; 0; 0; 0; 0)
e2 = (0; 1; 0; 0; 0)
e3 = (0; 0; 1; 0; 0)
e4 = (0; 0; 0; 1; 0)
e5 = (0; 0; 0; 0; 1)
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xt+1 =
0BBBBB@
p2t+1
d2t+1
r2t+1
ln

G
f=n
t+1

ln(1   t+1)
1CCCCCA
The structural restrictions implied by (18) are:7
e1(I   nB) = ((1  n)e2   e3 + e4 + ne5)B (20)
with similar denitions and where 2 is the AR coe¢ cient on p
2:
Following estimation I compute the relevant long run coe¢ cients. For capi-
tal:
blrgk_p1 =
bgk_p1
1  k1
; blr_p1 =
kb_p1
1  k1
blrd_p1 =
(1  k)bd_p1
1  k1
; blrr_p1 =
br_p1
1  k1
where 1 is the AR coe¢ cient on p
1; the b_p1 are the coe¢ cients w.r.t p1 and
lr denotes the long-run.
For labor:
blrgn_p2 =
bgn_p2
1  n22
; blr _p2 =
n2b _p2
1  n22
blrd_p2 =
(1  n)bd_p2
1  n2
; blrr_p2 =
br_p2
1  n22
with similar denitions and where 2 is the AR coe¢ cient on p
2:
7where
e1 = (1; 0; 0; 0; 0)
e2 = (0; 1; 0; 0; 0)
e3 = (0; 0; 1; 0; 0)
e4 = (0; 0; 0; 1; 0)
e5 = (0; 0; 0; 0; 1)
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5 Appendix E
Relating the Model to the Data in un  vn Space
5.1 The Data
The unemployment data include the following three alternatives: In one it is the
o¢ cial unemployment pool.8 In a second, it is the o¢ cial unemployment pool
plus marginally attached workers; these are dened as persons who want a job,
have searched for work during the prior 12 months, and were available to take a
job during the reference week, but had not looked for work in the past 4 weeks.9
In a third it is the o¢ cial unemployment pool plus workers who want a job;
these are workers who are out of the labor force but replied (in the CPS) in the
a¢ rmative to the question if they want a job now.10 Using these variables, and
a vacancy series,11 Figures 2 and 3 in the main text plot the data and the model
steady state equations in un   vn space for o¢ cial unemployment.The other two
pools are plotted below.
5.2 Construction of Figures 2 and 3
To see how Figure 2 is constructed start o¤ from the equations:
1
1

u
n
v
n

+  
2
v
n
26666666664
e2
24 (1  1   2) + 11  unvn 
+2

 2
v
n
 352 v
n
+
24 e311  unvn 
+e32

 2
v
n
 35 1
e1
26664
1
(1 )
QK
f
k
  pIf
k
 
24 e311  unvn 
+e32

 2
v
n
 35 v
n
37775
37777777775
=
1
(1  )
QN
f
n
(21)
1
 v
n
1  u
n

=  1 + g (22)
Using (21), the vacancy creation curve, and (22), the steady state ows
curve, one solves for un and
v
n given the steady state values of the variables
1
(1 )
QN
f
n
; 1(1 )
QK
f
k
 pIf
k
;  1;  2; g and the parameter values e1; e2; e31; e32; 1; 2; 1; 2
and :
8BLS code LNS13000000.
9This is computed as follows: the rate of o¢ cial unemployment plus marginally attached
(MA) workers is given in BLS series LNS13327708. The MA pool is extracted from the
dention of this rate which is
U+MA rate = (U pool + MA pool)/(LF pool + MA pool).
This is done using the pools for U and LF.
10BLS code LNS15026639.
11See Appendix B for the computation of the vacancy series.
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The plots are constructed so that they will pass through the sample means
of un and
v
n : In order to do so these sample means are posited in (21) and (22),
which are then solved for 1(1 )
QK
f
k
  pIf
k
and 1; determining the latter values
in the analysis.
Parameters and Steady State Values
Based on GMM from Table 2a, row 1
1 = 2
2 = 2
31 = 1
32 = 1
e1 = 77:31
e2 = 9:07
e31 =  2:79
e32 =  19:60
1 = 0:6
2 = 0:2
 = 0:66
Based on other studies
 = 0:5
Sample Average Values
1994  2006 2007  2013
v
n 0:0299 0:0255
u
n 0:054 0:083
1
(1 )
QK
f
k
  pIf
k
0:36 0:72
1
1 
QN
f
n
0:16 0:22
1
(1 )
QNsearch
f
n
1:485 1:447
 1 0:117 0:120
 2 0:068 0:044
g 0:003 0:0006
Likewise for the standard model, Figure 3:
c
1

v
n
u
n
 
+ 2 ()
   v
n
  = 1(1  ) QNsearchf
n
(23)

 v
n
1  u
n

=  1 + g (24)
Parameters and Steady State Values for the Standard Model
Based on GMM from Table 2b, row 3
c = 9:3
14
Based on other studies
 = 0:5
Steady State Values
as above
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5.3 Additional Tables
Table F-1
Variables in the un   vn Analysis of Figures F-1 and F-2
Sample Averages
u = o¢ cial unemployment+marginally attached
1994  2006 2007  2011
v
n 0:0299 0:0255
u
n 0:068 0:105
1
(1 )
QK
f
k
  pIf
k
0:36 0:72
1
1 
QN
f
n
0:16 0:22
1
(1 )
QNsearch
f
n
1:485 1:447
 0:117 0:120
g 0:003 0:0006
u = o¢ cial unemployment + want a job
1994  2006 2007  2011
v
n 0:0299 0:0255
u
n 0:096 0:132
1
(1 )
QK
f
k
  pIf
k
0:36 0:72
1
1 
QN
f
n
0:16 0:22
1
(1 )
QNsearch
f
n
1:485 1:447
 0:117 0:120
g 0:003 0:0006
Notes:
1. The rate of unemployment un here pertains to the pools indicated in the
titles.
2. The numbers are data averages except for the values of 1(1 )
QK
f
k
  pIf
k
in
the current model and of 1(1 )
QNsearch
f
n
in the standard model, which are solved
out of the steady state equations.
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5.4 Additional Figures
Figures F-1
Unemployment-Vacancies Analysis
u = o¢ cial unemployment+marginally attached
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u = o¢ cial unemployment + want a job
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vacancy creation 07-13,
st st flows      07-13
Notes:
1. The solid lines are the vacancy creation curves as in equation (21) and
the dashed lines are the steady state ows curve as in equation (22).
2. The blue lines pertain to the period 1994-2006. The red lines pertain to
the period 2007-2013.
3. The circles are the actual data points with the same colors indicating the
periods.
18
Figures F-2
Unemployment-Vacancies Analysis of the standard (Pissarides)
Model
u = o¢ cial unemployment+marginally attached
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u = o¢ cial unemployment + want a job
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Notes:
1. As in Figures F-2, except that the vacancy creation curve is equation 23)
and the dashed line is the steady state ows curve, equation 24).
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